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Introduction 
Recent pension reforms throughout Europe confine possibilities of early retirement (Hofäcker 
and Unt, 2013). Older workers, frequently defined as those aged 50 and above (e.g. Canduela et 
al. 2012; Van Dalen, Henkens and Wang 2015; Karpinska et al. 2015), are increasingly expected 
to work longer. This raises the question how working lives can be extended, especially in a 
knowledge-based economy where older workers’ skills are prone to become obsolete (cq. 
Henkens 2005). In this context, training opportunities – to update and upgrade knowledge – 
become relevant for both workers and employers. Prior studies showed that participation in 
training was associated with increased employability, productivity, and labour market 
participation of older workers (Barrett and O’Connell 2001; Bartel 1995; Belloni and Villosio 
2015; Groot and Maassen van den Brink 2000; Picchio and Van Ours 2013). During their career, 
employer-provided training was the most important source for individuals’ training (Hansson 
2008). Workers’ skills were important assets to organizations and investing in up-to-date 
knowledge could provide competitive advantage (Torraco 2000). However, several recent studies 
reported that employers were hesitant to provide training to older workers (e.g. Canduela et al. 
2012; Karpinska et al. 2015; Picchio and Van Ours 2013). Thus, the question persists how 
employers determine who receives training and who does not.  
Prior literature suggested that the low participation of older workers in training might at 
least partly be attributed to employers’ limited concern and involvement (Van Dalen, Henkens 
and Wang 2015; Taylor and Urwin 2001). Or, employers’ reluctance to provide training to older 
workers could be explained by persistent age-stereotypes (Brooke and Taylor 2005). Several 
studies showed that employers tended to believe that older workers were, for example, less 
productive than their younger counterparts (e.g. Canduela et al. 2012; Chui et al. 2001; Van 
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Dalen, Henkens and Schippers 2010).  
We feel it is a critical omission that comparatively little is known about ways in which 
workers and the government can affect employers’ provision of training to older workers. The 
current study contributes to the literature by examining how these two actors – the government 
and workers themselves – may affect employers’ decisions regarding the training opportunities 
for older workers. By doing so, we aim at providing a better understanding of employers’ 
considerations and the conditions for employability investments in older workers.  
We use data from the Netherlands to test our expectations regarding employers’ provision 
of training. In comparison to other European countries, the training situation of older workers in 
the Netherlands can be summarized as above average: The Netherlands lag behind the 
Scandinavian countries, but precede many Central and Eastern European countries. In the 28 
member states of the European Union (EU-28 average), on average only six per cent of the 
population aged 55-64 participated in education and training in Europe in 2015 (Eurostat 2015). 
This percentage is about twelve per cent in the Netherlands – comparable to the United Kingdom, 
Norway and France. The other Scandinavian countries and Switzerland have a higher training 
participation; there, between 16 and 25 per cent of the population aged 55-64 participated in 
training in 2015 (Eurostat 2015). With regard to workplace training specifically, Bassanini et al. 
(2005) show in their country comparison based on data from the Continuing Vocational Training 
Survey (CVTS), that the share of workers who receive employer-sponsored training is highest in 
the Scandinavian countries as well as the UK and France, were just about or above 50 per cent of 
the training is sponsored by employers. This percentage is lowest in the Southern (<30%) and 
Eastern European countries (<20%). The same authors report that in the Netherlands more than 
40 per cent of the workers receive employer-sponsored training; a rank in the upper middle with 
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Belgium, the Czech Republic and Ireland (Bassanini et al. 2005). To summarize, the training 
situation of older workers in the Netherlands is similar to many other Central European countries 
but the Scandinavian countries clearly lead this ranking. 
We conduct a vignette study to investigate what affects employers’ considerations to 
provide training to older workers in the Netherlands. A vignette study is a semi-experiment where 
respondents read a short description of a hypothetical situation. In our case a training situation is 
described and characteristics of worker and training are randomly varied. A vignette design 
benefits our research in two aspects. First, this semi-experiment eliminates omitted variable bias. 
Thus, effects found in these studies cannot be confounded and can be interpreted as causal 
inferences (Auspurg and Hinz 2015). Second, it (largely) eliminates the social desirability bias 
related to studies on employer-provided training (Alexander and Becker 1978; Wallander 2009). 
This methodology is, therefore, expected to provide a more accurate picture of conditions 
affecting employers’ willingness to provide training compared to standard surveys. 
 
Employer-provided training: costs, benefits and social exchange 
Employers are considered rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits associated with 
training investments when it comes to deciding to whom workplace training should be provided 
(Gazier 2001; Kalleberg et al. 1996). Ultimately, investments are made in situations and for those 
workers, where the highest benefits to training are expected.  
Different theoretical mechanisms provide insights into employers’ considerations. 
Employers might decide to train their existing staff because up-to-date knowledge benefits the 
organization and provides a competitive advantage: Better trained workers are reported to be 
more productive (Barrett and O’Connell 2001; Bartel 1995; Belloni and Villosio 2015; Groot and 
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Maassen van den Brink 2000; Picchio and Van Ours 2013) and investments in personnel 
increases the attractiveness of the organization for new employees (De Vries, Gründemann and 
Van Vuuren 2001). Employers might also offer workplace training as part of a social exchange 
relation where workers’ commitment to the organization and organizational support are 
exchanged (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). In this case, employers provide training to reward 
workers and increase their attachment to the organization. 
Research has repeatedly shown that workplace training is unequally distributed across 
workers’ age as older workers are reported to be less likely to receive employer-provided training 
(e.g. Bassanini et al. 2005; Canduela et al. 2012; Chui et al. 2001; Karpinska et al. 2015; Picchio 
and Van Ours 2013; Taylor and Walker 1994, 1998; De Vries, Gründemann and Van Vuuren 
2001). This finding could be explained by human capital theory (Becker 1964). A rational 
employer, who is conscious of the costs and benefits associated with training investments, 
recognizes that an advancing retirement decreases the possible (accumulated) benefits from 
training (Becker 1964; Bassanini et al. 2005; Canduela et al. 2012; Posthuma and Campion 
2009). The period that employers benefit from a training investment is shorter for older workers 
and might discourage employers to invest. 
 Next to workers’ age, contextual conditions might affect the provision of workplace 
training. For example the size of the organization (Bishop 1996; Knoke and Kalleberg 1994), the 
composition of the organization’s workforce (Bassanini et al. 2005; Canduela et al. 2012; Van 
Dalen, Henkens and Wang 2015), or the organization’s economic situation (Bishop 1996; 
Karpinksa et al. 2015) are reported to be relevant factors for employers’ training decisions. In the 
current study, we consider that the government may exert influence on employers’ willingness to 
provide training and that employers might be guided by workers’ interest in training and 
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commitment to the organization.  
Prior research on the government’s influence on (employer-provided) training is sparse. 
To our knowledge, there are only two studies that report findings related to the presumed 
relationship. Billett and colleagues (2011) expected that employers would respond to government 
reimbursements that encouraged them to retain older workers or to invest in their competence. 
Their results, referring to the Australian labour market, did not support the expectation. Another 
study – executed in the Netherlands – showed that older workers were more willing to participate 
in training when they were told that subsidiary training vouchers were offered through 
employers, rather than through the government (Borghans, Fouarge and de Grip 2011). These 
results, however, refer to workers’ willingness to attend training, rather than employers’ 
willingness to provide training. By conducting this research, we aim at contributing to the limited 
knowledge about the governments’ possible role with respect to employers’ provision of training.  
Second, we investigate whether a possible social exchange relation between workers and 
their organization might explain employers’ training provision. As previous literature argues, 
employers are confident that workers’ interest in receiving training signals higher productivity, 
more bonding with and commitment to the organization (Karpinska 2013; Mathieu and Zajac 
1990). Borghans, Fouarge and de Grip (2011) showed that intrinsically motivated workers were 
more likely to participate in training. In addition, other studies reported that employers appeared 
to be affected by workers’ motivation when it came to retaining or training decisions (Greenhalgh 
and Mavrotas 1994; Henkens, van Solinge and Cozijnsen 2009; Karpinska 2013). To follow up 
on prior research, we investigate whether employers’ considerations to provide training is 
dependent on individuals’ interest or motivation to pursue training.  
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Direct effects on employer-provided training 
We commence our expectations with the general hypothesis that employers take rational training 
decisions. The costs associated with employer-provided training comprise direct and indirect 
training costs. Direct costs refer the course fee paid by employers and indirect costs concern the 
length of the training during which workers are absent from work. Higher direct or indirect costs 
will discourage rational employers from investing in a worker. Hence, we expect that employers’ 
willingness to provide training decreases with increasing costs of the training (H1) and 
increasing duration of the training (H2).  
In line with human capital theory, rational employers can be expected to abstain from 
investing in older workers because older workers’ forthcoming retirement shortens the period in 
which training investments pay off. Thus, employers’ benefits to providing workplace training – 
and, therefore, plausibly also their willingness to make this investment – declines with the age of 
the worker. We hypothesize that employers’ willingness to provide training decreases with an 
increasing age of the worker (H3).  
The government has an interest that workplace training is offered, because life-long 
learning and the development of knowledge and skills are thought to be possibilities to extend 
older persons’ work life (e.g. Hancock 2006; Schilling and Larsen 2011). Governments can 
stimulate the provision of workplace training through reimbursements that reduce employers’ 
direct training costs. Additionally, government’s contributions to training might act as a 
normative incentive for employers to offer training. Based on this reasoning, we hypothesize that 
employers’ willingness to provide training is higher if the government reimburses part of the 
training costs (H4).  
Following social exchange theory, workers’ commitment to the organization and 
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employers’ organizational support may be exchanged (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). 
Employers might, for example, reward workers’ commitment to the organization, expressed as 
workers’ explicit interest in attaining training, by providing them training. To investigate the 
social exchange relation we hypothesize that employers’ willingness to provide training is higher 
if workers specifically indicate their interest in training (H5). 
 
Moderating effects on the relation between workers’ age and employer-provided training 
Based on the theoretical notions introduced above, we expected that workers’ age operated as a 
disincentive for employers to provide training. We explained that the period in which employers 
could reap the benefits of training investments shortened as older workers approached retirement. 
The negative relation between workers’ age and employers’ willingness to provide training is 
well-established in empirical research (Bassanini et al. 2005; Picchio and Van Ours 2013). We 
argue that two factors relating to employers’ investment decision might moderate this association.  
First, by decreasing employers’ direct training costs, governmental reimbursements might 
mitigate the negative relation between workers’ age and employers’ provision of training. 
Particularly when training is provided to older workers, these reimbursements might contribute to 
decrease employers’ uncertainty with regard to the pay-offs from training investments. As older 
workers are more prone to leave the labour market, for example due to ill-health, the prospect of 
having training costs (partly) reimbursed might counterbalance employers’ greater uncertainty 
and decrease the reservations against investing in training for older workers. Hence, employers 
might be especially responsive to government reimbursements if training is considered for older 
workers.  
Second, workers’ motivation to participate in training might weaken the negative effect of 
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their age on employers’ willingness to provide training. As laid out above, workers’ motivation 
and interest to participate in training signal commitment to the organization. Especially when 
older workers express their interest to participate in training, it suggests that they plan to remain 
active in the labour market. In terms of employers’ costs and benefits of training, this implies that 
the training investment is more likely to pay off. Hence, workers’ motivation might be more 
relevant for employers’ willingness to provide training if they are older. 
To summarize, we argue that the negative relation between workers’ age and employers’ 
willingness to provide training does not sustain in every situation and hypothesize that although 
employers’ willingness to provide training decreases with increasing age of the worker, this 
association is less negative if the government reimburses part of the costs (H6a) and if workers 
show interest in training (H6b). 
 
Data and methods 
We conducted a vignette study (also called factorial design) to investigate employers’ willingness 
to provide training. This method is frequently used to study human judgements (Alexander and 
Becker 1978; Ganong and Coleman 2006; Wallander 2009). In a vignette study, respondents, in 
our case employers, read a short description of a hypothetical situation or person. The researchers 
can randomly vary the characteristics they include in the description of the vignette. In our study, 
respondents were provided with two descriptions of a worker/training situation and asked for 
each how willing they were to offer the training. 
 To study employer-provided training, a vignette design has several advantages over 
general survey questionnaires. First, through vignette studies the social desirability related to 
sensitive questions is reduced. For example, when employers are asked directly about their 
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attitudes towards older workers, they might hide their stereotypes because age-stereotypes are 
frequently socially unaccepted. In the vignettes, respondents judge a person with several 
characteristics (among them is the ‘treatment’, e.g. the age of the worker). Due to the 
combination of characteristics, respondents are not attentive to the treatment and provide answers 
that are less prone to social desirability (Alexander and Becker 1978; Auspurg and Hinz 2015; 
Wallander 2009). Second, in survey research respondents who are asked to indicate their 
willingness to invest in workers’ training, might base their answer on different considerations. In 
a vignette study in contrast, only the described hypothetical scenario guides respondents’ 
decisions (Alexander and Becker 1978). This methodology is, therefore, expected to provide a 
more accurate picture of employers’ willingness to provide training compared to a standard 
survey. Last, the vignette study has an experimental design, i.e. the characteristics of the 
described person/situation are randomly assigned. Compared to regular survey data, this prevents 
omitted variable bias and allows drawing conclusions about causal relations (Auspurg and Hinz 
2015). 
  
Respondents 
The data collection for the vignette study took place as part of a larger company survey 
conducted in the Netherlands between April and June 2012. For more information regarding the 
sampling and data collection, see Fleischmann, Koster and Schippers (2015). Due to the 
generally very low response rate in corporate studies, we sampled 8,000 organizations with 10 or 
more employees. We oversampled large companies to guarantee sufficient responses from large 
organizations.  
Respondents had two possibilities to complete the questionnaire: They could use the paper 
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questionnaire sent with the first post mail or fill in an online questionnaire. If respondents chose 
the online version of the questionnaire, they received two additional questions, which comprised 
the two vignettes analysed in this study. In total – paper and online version together – we 
received n = 983 completed questionnaires. This reflected a response rate of about 12 per cent. 
As expected, our response rate was lower than in individual surveys, but it was comparable to 
other corporate studies conducted in the USA and Europe (Kalleberg et al. 1996; Van Dalen et al. 
2006). Of all completed questionnaires, about half of the respondents (n = 477) chose the online 
version and provided valid answers to the vignette questions.  
The questionnaires were sent to companies’ human resources (HR) department to ensure 
that a person familiar with the human resource practices of the organization completed it. This, 
however, meant that persons with very different positions in the HR department completed the 
questionnaire: for example, these could be owners of companies as well as administrative staff 
members. In this study on employer-provided training, we decided to use only a subsample of 
respondents – those who could be identified to be responsible for training decisions. We selected 
respondents fulfilling one of the following four positions within the organization (n = 296): chief 
executive officer, owner of the company, board member/director or branch manager. Moreover, 
we excluded respondents who indicated that they did not supervise staff or this information was 
missing (n = 71). Finally, three respondents were excluded from the analyses because they did not 
disclose all relevant information: one is lost because his/her age is unknown and two did not 
provide the size of their company. Our final selection refers to 94 chief executive officers, 74 
owners of the company, 40 board members/directors and 14 branch managers. In the following 
we refer to the respondents as ‘employers’, because they can be considered to be involved in 
personnel decisions, such as workplace training. Given that each respondent answered two 
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vignettes, our analyses draw on a sample of 444 vignettes nested in 222 respondents.  
With regard to the background characteristics of the employer and the company, we can 
describe the sample as follows. Respondents’ average age was close to 48 years and more than 60 
per cent of them were men. About 54 per cent of the respondents attained a higher professional 
education, and about 20 per cent a university level education. Furthermore, more than two thirds 
of them reported having daily contact with older workers. Regarding the characteristics of the 
company, about one out of four companies were from the sector ‘Trade, Transport, Catering’, and 
about one out of five each from ‘Business services’ (16.7%) and ‘Mining, Industry’ (15.8%). For 
further information on the descriptive characteristics of the sample, see Table 1. 
 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
 
Study design 
Figure 1 shows an example vignette. The vignette starts by setting the context: ‘It is often noticed 
that training is important for the employability of workers. Below you find two descriptions of 
workers. Could you indicate for each of these persons whether you would offer them training?’  
This introduction is followed by the vignette, i.e. the description of the worker and 
workplace situation. The possible characteristics included in the vignettes are summarized in 
Table 2. The vignette includes the age of the fictitious worker with seven possibilities ranging 
between 44 and 63 years. We tested several ways to include age in the analyses: in three 
categories, with a linear term alone, and with a linear and quadratic term. We decided against 
categorizing age, because this would imply losing relevant information. Ultimately, we chose to 
include a linear and quadratic term for age because the likelihood-ratio test revealed that this 
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model fitted the data better (LR Chi2 (1) =13.58, p < .001) than a model with only a linear 
specification of age. Next, three categories of direct costs of the training were provided in the 
vignettes: 500 Euro, 1500 Euro and 3000 Euro. In the analyses, we included the training costs as 
two dummy variables. Medium costs (1500 Euro) and high costs (3000 Euro) were compared to 
the reference category of low costs (500 Euro). To tackle the indirect costs of training, we 
provided information on the length of the training, which was either “five consecutive working 
days” (short; reference category) or “four months, one day a week” (long). To investigate whether 
reimbursements by the government affected employers’ considerations and whether workers’ 
commitment was exchanged for employer-provided training, we included two attributes in the 
vignette description. First, whether the government would reimburse part to the training costs 
(government = 1) or whether this was not mentioned (reference). Second, whether the worker 
was interested in receiving training (interest = 1) or, again, whether this was not mentioned in the 
vignette (reference). 
 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
 
After respondents read the hypothetical description, we assessed their willingness to provide 
training by asking “Would you offer training to this person?”. Respondents indicated their 
willingness on a scale, with higher values indicating greater willingness to provide training. The 
eleven-point scale ranges from zero (“very unlikely”) to 10 (“very likely”) and is used as the 
dependent variable. In our study, the mean willingness to provide training is 6.50 (see Table 1) 
and is somewhat left skewed (median = 7, modus = 8).  
The possible unique combinations of characteristics included in the vignette description 
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constitute the vignette universe. Based on the characteristics included in our vignette (seven 
possible ages; three cost categories; etc.) we have a total of 168 (7 x 3 x 2 x 2 x 2) unique 
possible combinations of characteristics. Compared to a factorial design were all combinations of 
characteristics are implemented in the data collection, a vignette study regards a selection of the 
possible combinations as sufficient (Wallander 2009). Instead of using all 168 possible 
combinations, we formulated 60 different vignettes in which the characteristics are randomly 
varied. We made sure that each possible characteristic was included about the same number of 
times in the vignettes. Each respondent received two vignettes that were randomly assigned.  
In the analyses, we control for background characteristics of the respondent and the 
organization. Those background characteristics are retrieved from the accompanying company 
survey. By including these background characteristics, we assess whether the willingness to 
provide employer-provided training is dependent on company or respondent characteristics. For 
the descriptive information on the variables that are included in the analyses, please refer again to 
Table 1.  
 
*** Table 2 about here *** 
 
Control variables 
Prior research relying on survey results has shown that employer-provided training is dependent 
on background characteristics of employers and organizations (e.g. Henkens, van Solinge and 
Cozijnsen 2009). We include the following information as control variables in our analyses. 
Regarding employers, we consider the gender, age, and educational level of respondents. 
Respondents’ educational level is measured with a categorical variable distinguishing ‘no tertiary 
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education’, ‘secondary vocational education’ (Dutch: middelbaar beroepsonderwijs, MBO), 
‘higher professional education’ (Dutch: hoger beroepsonderwijs, HBO) (reference category) and 
‘university education’ (Dutch: Wetenschappelijk onderwijs, WO). Moreover, we include a control 
variable for the frequency the respondent has contact with older workers in the organization. We 
did so, because inter-group contact can be expected to decrease stereotypes (Pettigrew and Tropp 
2006). Contact with older workers was operationalized with the question ‘Due to your work, how 
often do you have contact with older workers inside and/or outside of your organisation?’. 
Respondents could answer (1) ‘daily’, (2) ‘several times a week’, (3) ‘weekly’, (4) ‘monthly’ or 
(5) ‘hardly ever’. The last three categories (3, 4 and 5) were recoded into one category. 
We control for four organizational background characteristics. We include the size of the 
company, because employer-provided training previously appeared to be more common in larger 
organizations (Bassanini et al. 2005; Bishop 1996; Knoke and Kalleberg 1994; Sutherland 2016; 
Taylor & Urwin 2001). Also, training provision might vary across economic sectors (Bassanini et 
al. 2005; Bishop 1996; Knoke and Kalleberg 1994; Picchio and Van Ours 2013; Sutherland 
2016). Companies facing scarcity might rather decide to invest in their existing personnel than to 
fire and hire new workers (Knoke and Kalleberg 1994). Also, higher educated workers were 
more likely to receive training (Sutherland 2016), arguably because employer-provided training is 
more important to create commitment in organizations with higher educated workers (Branham 
2001).  
 
Method 
The dependent variable willingness to provide training is measured on an 11-point scale and 
allows us to apply linear regression models. In vignette studies, the level of analysis is the 
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vignette (consisting of the random conditions) and not the respondent as is usual in survey 
research (Ganong and Coleman 2006; Wallander 2009). To account for the nested nature of our 
data, we estimate multilevel regression models. With this method we account for the hierarchical 
structure of our data, with two observations being nested within one respondent.  
In Table 3, we present four regression models. In the first model we only include the 
vignette variables. In the second model we include the background characteristics to account for 
possible differences across respondents and companies. In the third and fourth model we include 
the interaction effects to test Hypothesis 6a and 6b. 
 
Results 
The results are shown in Table 3. As apparent when comparing Model 1 to Model 2, none of the 
relations found for the vignette characteristics changed after adjusting for the characteristics of 
the employer and the characteristics of the company. Moreover, only one background 
characteristics of employers – the size of their organization – was significantly related to their 
willingness to provide training. It appeared that the larger the organization was, the more willing 
employers were to provide training.  
Our results for the vignette characteristics (Model 1 and 2) showed that training costs 
were negatively related to employers’ willingness to provide training. When the costs for training 
were medium (1500 Euro) or high (3000 Euro), employers’ willingness to provide training was 
significantly lower compared to low training costs of 500 Euro. This supported our first 
hypotheses. We did not find a significant association between the duration of training and 
employer-provided training. We, thus, could not corroborate our second hypothesis. Next, the 
models showed a significant, squared and negative coefficient for the age of the hypothetical 
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worker. This implied that, as hypothesized in the third hypothesis, employers’ willingness to 
provide training decreased with an increasing age of the worker. The squared relationship 
indicated that the decrease in employers’ willingness to provide training was accelerating with 
workers’ increasing age. We also studied how possible government reimbursements affected 
employer-provided training. Our analyses implied that reimbursement offered by the government 
did not to directly affect employers’ decisions. Hence, our fourth hypothesis was not supported. 
Last, our results revealed that workers’ interest in training was relevant for employers’ 
willingness to provide training: employers were more willing to provide training if workers 
specifically stated their interest to receive training. This finding corroborated our fifth hypothesis.  
  
*** Table 3 about here *** 
 
 Next to the direct effect of workers’ age on employers’ willingness to provide training, we 
argued that this relation was moderated by the government’s reimbursement practices (H6a) and 
workers interest (H6b). We tested these assumptions in Model 3 and Model 4, respectively. In 
Model 3, we saw that the negative relation between workers’ age and employers’ willingness to 
provide training was significantly moderated by government reimbursements to training costs. 
More specifically, we found the following (see Figure 2). While employers’ willingness to 
provide training generally declined with workers’ increasing age (see upper plot Figure 2), the 
decline was rather pronounced if government reimbursements were not provided (solid line) and 
more flat in case government reimbursements were offered (dotted line). The total decrease of 
employers’ willingness to provide training between age 44–63 amounted to 1.7 if government 
reimbursements were provided, and to 2.8 if government reimbursements were not provided, 
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both on a scale from zero to ten. An additional test showed that this decline was significantly less 
strong in case government reimbursements were provided compared to the condition that 
governments did not reimburse training costs (b = -1.144, p < .05). We now turn towards the 
lower plot of Figure 2. At each age included in the vignettes (i.e., 44, 49, 53, …, 63), the bars 
display the difference between the two lines from the upper plot, reflecting the predicted scores 
of employers’ willingness to provide training under the condition that government 
reimbursements were (dotted line) or were not (solid line) provided. The 95% confidence 
intervals, which all overlap zero, indicate that employers’ willingness to train did not significantly 
differ with and without government reimbursements at any age during workers’ career. In sum, 
we found that government reimbursements buffered the negative relation between workers’ age 
and employers’ willingness to provide training. All in all, this supports hypothesis 6a. 
  
*** Figure 2 and 3 about here *** 
 
In Model 4 we tested whether workers’ interest to receive training moderated the negative 
relation between workers’ age and employers’ willingness to provide training. While employers 
were generally less willing to provide training as workers get older, this relation depended on 
workers’ interest in training. We depict the moderation effect in Figure 3.  
The upper plot of Figure 3 shows that employers’ willingness to provide training 
decreased steadily with workers’ increasing age in case workers did not explicitly state their 
interest in training (solid line). A different picture appears for workers who indicated that they 
were interested in receiving training (dotted line): For this group, employers’ willingness to 
provide training was rather stable up to approximately age 55. Beyond age 55, however, 
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employers’ willingness to provide training steeply declined, while at age 63, employers were 
about equally likely (or unlikely) to provide training to those who did and did not state interest in 
receiving training. The total decrease of employers’ willingness to provide training between age 
44–63 amounted to 2.4 if workers were interested in training, and to 1.9 if workers did not 
mention their interest in training, both on a scale from zero to ten. An additional test revealed that 
the decrease did not significantly differ between the two groups (b = -0.564, p > .05). As the 
lower plot of Figure 3 shows, it paid off for workers to have stated their interest in training: For 
age 49–57, the confidence intervals around the bar graphs did not overlap with zero, indicating 
that employers were significantly more willing to provide training if workers stated their interest 
compared to when they did not. In sum, that the relation between workers’ age and employers’ 
willingness to provide training was moderated by workers’ interest in training. We clearly 
detected that workers’ motivation delayed the negative impact of workers’ age for employers’ 
willingness to provide training. These results corroborate our hypothesis. 
 
Conclusion & Discussion 
Workplace training is said to be unequally distributed with regard to workers’ age. In this article, 
we set out to investigate two ways in which workers and governments can affect training 
decisions of employers. We conducted a vignette study, a semi-experimental design, to study the 
provision of workplace-training to workers aged 44–63. 
 Generally, our results indicated that several conditions operated as disincentives for 
employers to provide training costs. First, employers were less willing to provide training if the 
direct costs of the training were higher. Moreover, employers tended to be less willing to provide 
training to older workers and this decline appeared to accelerate with increasing age of workers.  
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Next to these disincentives, other factors were found to contribute to employers’ training 
provision. With regard to government reimbursements our results did not show a direct relation 
with employers’ willingness to provide training, but a buffering effect: employers’ willingness to 
provide training decreased less steeply with workers’ increasing age when there were government 
reimbursements involved compared to when there were not. 
The lack of identifying a direct effect of government reimbursements on employers’ 
willingness to provide training corresponded to findings of other studies (Billett et al. 2011; 
Borghans, Fouarge and de Grip 2011). A possible explanation might be found in the Dutch 
context. Van Dalen, Henkens and Schippers (2009) presented figures that indicated that only two 
per cent of the employers in the Netherlands thought that the government was responsible for 
investments in lifelong learning. The same study reported that this percentage was 46 per cent in 
the UK, 31 per cent in Greece, and 25 per cent in Spain. It seemed that Dutch employers regarded 
employers and workers to be responsible for training investments (Van Dalen et al. 2009), rather 
than the government. Further research is required to assess how and under which circumstances 
government reimbursements can be effective. Rather than having immoderate expectations of the 
possible returns to government reimbursements, we recommend to think about possible strategies 
that governments can apply to support employers’ training practices.  
Moreover, we tackled the question whether employers’ training decisions were dependent 
on workers’ interest in training. Our results corroborated both a direct relation of workers’ interest 
for employers’ training provision and a moderating effect. We found that if workers explicitly 
stated their interest in training, employers’ willingness to provide training remained rather stable 
up to age 55, but decreased steeply afterwards (compare Figure 3). In contrast, if workers did not 
explicitly state their interest in training, employers’ willingness to provide training decreased 
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steadily with workers’ increasing age. Moreover, employers were significantly more willing to 
provide training to workers who did, compared to those who did not, state their interest until 
workers reached age 60. Taken together, these findings indicated that workers’ motivation 
appeared to delay the decrease of employer-provided training with workers’ age.  
The findings regarding the moderating effect of government reimbursements and workers’ 
interest are relevant in at least two aspects. First, employers’ training considerations can be 
affected by the context. Our study indicates that active individual or government commitment to 
workplace training increases employers’ willingness to provide training. Ultimately, this might 
result in higher actual training provisions. Second, on the one hand the moderating effects imply 
that employers are less reluctant to provide training than frequently suggested, but on the other 
hand that employers might decide to restrict training to specific circumstances (e.g. if government 
reimbursements are offered) or to specific (groups of) workers (e.g. the motivated ones). It may 
be valuable for governments to direct their campaigns towards a universal access to training, for 
example under the headline of life-long learning and sustained employability of workers. 
Our study has some limitations. First, the response rate of our survey was rather low. This 
is frequently the case in corporate surveys (Kalleberg et al. 1996; Van Dalen et al. 2006). It might 
imply that the participating organizations are not a random selection of Dutch organizations and 
one has to be cautious when generalizing our results to the general population.  
Second, due to priming we might have overestimated respondents’ willingness to provide 
training. In our vignette, employers’ average willingness to provide training amounted to 6.50 on 
a scale from zero to ten. Other vignette studies reported lower scores when comparable topics 
were investigated, such as employers likelihood to train or retain older workers or to hire early 
retirees (e.g. Henkens, van Solinge and Cozijnsen 2009; Karpinska et al. 2011; Karpinska et al. 
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2015). Also the rather low percentage (12%) of the Dutch population aged 55-64 that participated 
in education or training in 2014 (Eurostat 2015) might suggest we overestimated employers’ 
willingness to train. We suspect out introductory sentence to our vignette, stating that ‘[…] 
training is important for the employability of workers’, to have triggered the priming. Despite this 
limitation, it is unlikely that the reported relationships between the vignette characteristics and 
employers’ willingness to provide training are biased. This is, because the same priming 
condition was used for every respondent and independent of the characteristics included in the 
vignette description. Thus, if priming applies, the introductory sentence would have affected all 
provided vignettes to the same extent. 
Third, in this study we cannot and do not draw conclusions about employers’ decision 
whether or not to offer training. We estimated how willing employers were to train the 
hypothetical person and solely indicated employers’ inclination to offer training on a scale from 
zero to ten. We do not know whether there is a cut-off point that separates no training provision 
from training provision, and where this is. Future research might want to investigate employers’ 
explicit training choice. These so-called (forced) discrete choice experiments bring along their 
own advantages and limitations (e.g. Amaya-Amaya, Gerard and Ryan 2008; Veldwijk et al. 
2014).  
Last, we investigated the provision of workplace training for hypothetical workers aged 
44–63. Prior literature did not define a common age standard to categorize someone as an ‘older 
worker’. Eurostat implicitly defined older workers as those aged 55 and above. Most authors 
referred to ‘older workers’ from age 50 onwards (e.g. Canduela et al. 2012; Van Dalen, Henkens 
and Wang 2015; Karpinska et al. 2015). Again others already regarded those from age 45 
onwards as older workers (Billett et al. 2011). Our focus on workers aged 44–63 implies that we 
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only reflect on employers’ willingness to provide training for a selected group of middle-aged 
and older workers. Our analyses do not allow drawing conclusions about when in workers’ career 
employer-provided training is highest and from which age on it decreases. Recent analyses using 
British data show that both the chance to receive training and the length of the training 
significantly decline after age 40 (Sutherland 2016). A study of Borghans, Fouarge and de Grip 
(2011) on the Netherlands suggests a similar decline of training participation beyond age 45. 
Moreover, descriptive results based on the Netherlands Working Conditions Survey (NEA) 
indicate that work-related participation in training decreases after age 35 (NEA Benchmarktools 
2016). With regard to our study, this might suggest that the provision of workplace training is 
already at a lower level for the youngest workers – those aged 44 – compared to the expected 
level for even younger workers. If this were the case, we would underestimate older workers’ 
disadvantage in receiving training in this study.  
Our study contributes to prior research by providing evidence that a focus on workers’ age 
and training costs does not entirely cover employers’ considerations. We show that government 
reimbursements and workers’ motivation might also be relevant factors affecting employers’ 
training decisions, especially if it comes to older workers. Interpreted from the social exchange 
perspective introduced above, employers and workers seem to enter a relationship where workers 
exchange their motivation with employers’ provision of training. However, whether this effect 
evolves solely due to social exchange between the two parties or whether different underlying 
mechanisms are at play, cannot be said with certainty. Future research, for example using 
qualitative interviews with employers, might wish to focus on other possible explanations for 
employers’ training investments. What can be concluded from our study is that, in order to 
enhance the training situation for older workers, workers, governments and employers will have 
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to cooperate to find suitable practices. This might ultimately also contribute to an increase in 
workers’ employability and their labour market participation.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of vignette, employer, and company characteristics. 
 
Mean/Percentage SD Range 
Vignette characteristics (n = 444)    
Willingness to provide training 6.50 2.59 0-10 
Training costs  
   
Low (ref.) 31.9%  0/1 
Medium 38.7% 
 
0/1 
High 29.5% 
 
0/1 
Duration of training  
   
Short (ref.) 49.8%  0/1 
Long 50.2% 
 
0/1 
Age worker 10.73 5.98 0-19 
Interest worker 43.7% 
 
0/1 
Government reimbursements 52.3% 
 
0/1 
Characteristics employer (n = 222) 
   
Man 63.5% 
 
0/1 
Age 47.73 9.13 24-69 
Educational level 
   
No tertiary education 8.6% 
 
0/1 
Secondary vocational education (‘MBO’) 17.1% 
 
0/1 
Higher professional education (‘HBO’) (ref.) 53.6%  0/1 
University education (‘WO’) 20.7% 
 
0/1 
Contact with older workers 
   
Daily (ref.) 67.1%  0/1 
Several times a week  19.8% 
 
0/1 
Less than weekly 13.1% 
 
0/1 
Characteristics company (n = 222) 
   
Scarcity labour supply 27.5% 
 
0/1 
Size of company (log transformation) 3.98 1.46 0.69-8.84 
Educational level     
Mixed 27.5%  0/1 
More than 50% low (ref.) 37.9%  0/1 
More than 50% medium 19.4%  0/1 
More than 50% high 15.3% 
 
0/1 
Industrial sector  
   
Agriculture, Construction 14.4% 
 
0/1 
Mining, Industry 15.8% 
 
0/1 
Trade, Transport, Catering (ref.) 27.5%  0/1 
Communication, Financial services 5.4% 
 
0/1 
Business services 16.7% 
 
0/1 
Government, Education 11.3% 
 
0/1 
Culture, Sports, else 9.0% 
 
0/1 
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Table 2. Characteristics included in the vignette study. 
Variable Categories Operationalization 
   
Age worker 44 years 
49 years 
53 years 
55 years 
57 years 
60 years 
63 years 
0 
5 
9 
11 
13 
16 
19 
   
Training costs 1500 Euro, medium costs 
3000 Euro, high costs  
500 Euro, low costs (reference) 
1 (Medium) 
1 (High) 
0 
   
Duration of training 16 days, long duration 
5 days, short duration (reference) 
1 
0 
   
Government reimbursements Reimbursements from government 
No information provided (reference) 
1 
0 
   
Interest worker Interested in training 
No information provided (reference) 
1 
0 
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Table 3. Multilevel linear regressions predicting employers’ willingness to provide training. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Vignette characteristics     
Training costs (ref.=low)     
Medium -1.028*** -0.999*** -0.971*** -1.052*** 
 (0.197) (0.196) (0.195) (0.198) 
High -1.365*** -1.348*** -1.301*** -1.360*** 
 (0.234) (0.232) (0.232) (0.234) 
Duration of training (ref.=short)     
Long -0.039 -0.020 -0.029 -0.002 
 (0.182) (0.181) (0.180) (0.181) 
Age worker 0.055 0.037 -0.001 -0.055 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.052) (0.075) 
Age squared worker -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Government reimbursements 0.013 0.028 -0.625 -0.104 
 (0.173) (0.172) (0.367) (0.181) 
Interest worker 0.706*** 0.667*** 0.688*** 0.333 
 (0.182) (0.181) (0.180) (0.462) 
Interaction terms     
Age worker * reimbursement government   0.060*  
   (0.030)  
Age worker * interest worker    0.192 
    (0.106) 
Age squared worker * interest worker    -0.012* 
    (0.005) 
Characteristics employer     
Man  0.094 0.078 0.123 
  (0.304) (0.303) (0.300) 
Age  0.017 0.017 0.015 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Educational level (ref.= Higher professional 
education (‘HBO’)) 
    
No tertiary  -0.467 -0.465 -0.480 
  (0.514) (0.512) (0.507) 
Secondary vocational education (‘MBO’)  -0.599 -0.581 -0.638 
  (0.396) (0.394) (0.390) 
University education (‘WO’)  0.153 0.131 0.142 
  (0.348) (0.347) (0.343) 
Contact with older workers (ref.= daily)     
Several times a week   0.163 0.188 0.165 
  (0.348) (0.346) (0.343) 
Less than weekly  -0.309 -0.296 -0.294 
  (0.415) (0.414) (0.409) 
Characteristics company     
Scarcity labour supply  -0.278 -0.260 -0.230 
  (0.303) (0.302) (0.299) 
Size of company (log)  0.407*** 0.409*** 0.411*** 
  (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) 
Educational level (ref.= more than 50% low)     
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Mixed  -0.131 -0.153 -0.180 
  (0.345) (0.344) (0.341) 
More than 50% medium  0.692 0.664 0.663 
  (0.404) (0.402) (0.398) 
More than 50% high  0.692 0.658 0.654 
  (0.461) (0.459) (0.454) 
Industrial sector (ref.=Trade, Transport, Catering)     
Agriculture, Construction  -0.118 -0.113 -0.223 
  (0.442) (0.440) (0.438) 
Mining, Industry  0.385 0.397 0.355 
  (0.422) (0.420) (0.416) 
Communication, Financial services  0.999 0.993 0.888 
  (0.675) (0.672) (0.667) 
Business services  0.528 0.563 0.489 
  (0.429) (0.427) (0.423) 
Government, Education  0.167 0.204 0.128 
  (0.515) (0.513) (0.508) 
Culture, Sports, else  0.416 0.456 0.379 
  (0.529) (0.527) (0.523) 
Constant 7.759*** 5.056*** 5.387*** 5.410*** 
 (0.339) (0.925) (0.936) (0.975) 
n (employers) 222 222 222 222 
n (vignettes) 444 444 444 444 
Variance lower level (employers) 3.561 2.670 2.647 2.554 
Variance higher level (vignettes) 2.220 2.223 2.202 2.232 
Log likelihood -966.55 -943.19 -941.17 -940.46 
Wald chi2 (df) 118.1 (7) 174.9 (25) 180.6 (26) 182.3 (27) 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Example vignette provided to Dutch employers (translated from Dutch). 
 
  
Version 7, vignette 1 
 
It is often noticed that training is important for the employability of workers. Below you find two 
descriptions of workers. Could you indicate for each of these persons whether you would offer 
them training? 
  
 
Mr. Bakker is aged 57. He indicates that he would like to participate in some training to increase 
his work-related skills. The training that applies to him costs 1500 Euro and has a duration of five 
consecutive working days. If he successfully completes the training, part of the training costs will 
be reimbursed by the government.  
 
Would you offer training to this person? 
Very unlikely            very likely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Figure 2. Predicted scores for the relation between workers’ age and employers’ willingness to 
provide training, moderated by the provision of government reimbursements (upper plot). Bars 
with 95% confidence intervals indicate the difference between the two predicted lines (lower plot; 
95% CI overlapping zero indicate non-significant differences). 
Notes: The predictions refer to male employers; further, all employers’ and organizations’ 
background characteristics are held constant at their reference category (for categorical 
variables) or their mean (see Table 1). The vignette characteristics are held constant at medium 
costs, short length and interest in training not provided. 
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Figure 3. Predicted scores for the relation between workers’ age and employers’ willingness to 
provide training, moderated by workers’ interest in training (upper plot). Bars with 95% 
confidence intervals indicate the difference between the two predicted lines (lower plot; 95% CI 
overlapping zero indicate non-significant differences). 
Notes: The predictions refer to male employers; further, all employers’ and organizations’ 
background characteristics are held constant at their reference category (for categorical 
variables) or their mean (see Table 1). The vignette characteristics are held constant at medium 
costs, short length and government reimbursements not provided. 
 
 
